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Margaret S. Russell t
INTRODUCTION
FEW TOPICS EXCITE the passions of legal scholars, feminists,
and politicians alike. One such subject is legal abortion, a con-
cept which remains unsettled' almost twenty years following the
Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade.2 Since Roe, the abortion
debate has centered on government funding of abortion. Congress
has refused to subsidize abortion through appropriations for over a
decade.' This has affected access to abortion by indigents,4 in-
mates,5 and military service women.6 The Supreme Court decision
in Rust v. SullivangeI demonstrates even broader impacts of govern-
ment funding decisions. The constitutional rights of health care
t This note was written under the supervision of Professor Laura B. Chisolm.
1. See Michael J. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde
Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1114
(1980) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade is one of the most controversial in
modem constitutional law. Other decisions were as controversial when handed down but few
have been as persistently controversial." (citations omitted)).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that pre-viability abortion is a privacy right).
3. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (providing that Hyde Amendment Title
XIX Medicaid reimbursement for childbirth expenses but not abortion expenses is
constitutional).
4. Id. at 298.
5. See Gibson v. Mathews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Pub. L. No. 99-
500, § 209, 100 Stat. 1783-56 (statutory bar to federal payment for inmate abortions).
6. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181, 193 n.25 (E.D. LA 1980); aff'd, 794
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 1093 (1984) (providing that "[flunds avail-
able to the Department of Defense may not be used to perform abortions except where the life
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term").
7. 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding the constitutionality of regulations restricting Title
X funding to projects which do not perform abortions or abortion counseling).
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providers can be implicated by administrative regulations aimed at
limiting the approved scope of abortion project funding.
Abortion continues to be "subsidized"' by federal tax exemption
of organization income and donor deductions. Thirty-one percent
of the nation's abortion clinics and thousands of non-profit hospitals
providing abortion and abortion counseling9 (in addition to the
usual range of health care services) currently enjoy tax-exempt sta-
tus under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). 1  Legislation'1 aimed
at denying tax-exempt status to abortion providers has been intro-
duced in Congress. 2 While none of the proposed legislation has
been enacted into law,' 3 the continuing tax-exempt status of abor-
tion providers promises to be another subject of public contention
and political debate. 4
8. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (explaining
that tax-exemption is tantamount in some respects to funding as government subsidy).
9. See 132 CONG. REC. S14860 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kerry).
10. I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (West Supp. 1992) defines organizations that can be exempt from
taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary
or educational purposes.
Taxpayer contributions to § 501(cX3) organizations are deductible under § 170(cX2).
11. While legislation is the subject of this paper, administrative regulation also could be
subject to similar constitutional challenges. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, the Court
explained that:
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it considers im-
proper; and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In the first instance, however,
the responsibility for construing the Code falls on the IRS. Since Congress cannot
be expected to anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or carry out day-
to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the court to implement the
legislative will.
461 U.S. 574, 596-7 (1983). But see id. at 612-23 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
12. For text of legislative proposals introduced in Congress, see infra note 89 [hereinaf-
ter "Humphrey Amendments"].
13. Past legislative proposals to revoke tax-exempt status to abortion providers have
been unsuccessful. While there have been many unsuccessful legislative proposals to limit the
tax-exempt status of charitable organizations which perform or counsel patients regarding
abortion, some of the most notable include: H.R. 624, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (attempt-
ing to amend the IRC to deny tax-exempt status to organizations which directly or indirectly
perform abortions; the amendment was never advanced beyond the Committee level); 134
CONG. REc. S15013, (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1988) (attempting to amend the IRC through Amend-
ment No. 3499 so as to deny "tax-exempt status to organizations which perform or provide
facilities for abortions"; the amendment was tabled and never reconsidered on the Senate
floor); 132 CONG. Rac. S14844 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (attempting to amend IRC through
Amendment No. 3184 so as "to deny status as a tax-exempt organization, and as a charitable
contribution recipient, for organizations which perform, finance, or provide facilities for abor-
tions"; the amendment failed by a vote of sixty-four to thirty-four on the Senate floor).
14. The effects of denying tax-exempt status to organizations that perform abortion and
abortion counseling would be dramatic. In one 1986 Congressional study, it was found that
legislation would impact:
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This paper discusses constitutional limitations to legislation lim-
iting the tax-exempt status of abortion providers. If tax exemption
and funding are equivalent, the Rust decision implies that organiza-
tions involved in abortion or abortion counseling could be denied
tax-exempt status. However, a denial of tax-exempt status could be
a threat to constitutionally protected rights. If an entire organiza-
tion is denied tax-exempt status for engaging in a proportion of
abortion-related activity, legislation could be seen as an unconstitu-
tional condition15 or penalty. Requirements that government subsi-
dized projects be separated from unsubsidized activities could also
be unconstitutionally burdensome. Therefore, a denial of tax-ex-
empt status to abortion providers may invoke different constitu-
tional barriers than the refusal to fund abortions and abortion-
related speech encountered in Rust and previous abortion funding
cases.
16
[N]on profit hospitals, university... health maintenance organizations, and philan-
thropic foundations...
[Miany Protestant and Jewish faith groups and agencies could lose their tax-exempt
status because of their support for abortion rights and services that often include
clergy counseling on abortion.
The types of organizations we know will be at risk are: [t]he Nation's 3,591 nongov-
ernmental, not for profit hospitals; [n]early three-fourths of all health maintenance
organizations [HMO's]; [t]hirty-one percent of the Nation's abortion clinics; [m]any
of the 90 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans; [s]tate run medical colleges and univer-
sities; [a]nd any voluntary employees' beneficiary societies [VEBA] or labor organi-
zations that provide sickness benefits ....
132 CONG. REC. S14860 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
In response to legislation introduced in the Senate, many organizations expressed their
concern regarding the wide reaching effects of legislation denying tax-exempt status to orga-
nizations that perform abortions. See 132 CONG. REc. S14850-57 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
For example, the American Council on Education found that an amendment of this type
"could jeopardize the tax-exempt status of most major public and private universities that
operate teaching hospitals." Id. at S14852. Likewise, a representative of Kaiser Permanente
noted that legislation could effect health care provided to nearly five million members in 16
states. Id. at S14851.
15. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine scrutinizes government invitations to for-
feit constitutional rights in exchange for the conferral of benefits. The doctrine examines
which constitutional rights society considers absolute and which rights may be sacrificed in
exchange for funding or subsidy. Government conditions implicate other rights. See, eg.,
Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 358 (1988) (freedom of association); Regan v. Taxation With
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983) (speech); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (religion).
16. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding conditioning provision of
medical services on choice not to have an abortion although the choice to fund childbirth to
the exclusion of abortion is actually more costly); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980)
(holding that Hyde Amendment and Illinois statute which condition Medicaid benefits on
choice not to have an abortion are not violative of equal protection clause of 14th Amend-
ment); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (holding that state payment of medical expenses
conditional on choice not to have an abortion is constitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (validating city policy which pro-
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Part I discusses the constitutional rights threatened by legisla-
tion to deny tax-exempt status to abortion providers. Part II re-
views the general concepts of unconstitutional conditions which
may protect abortion providers from discriminatory tax treatment
under section 501(c)(3). Part III addresses specific constitutional
limitations to legislation aimed at denying tax-exempt status. This
analysis demonstrates that some constitutional barriers might pre-
vent a denial of tax-exempt status to hospitals and abortion clinics.
Nonetheless, the lack of specificity in analysis by the Court leaves
some constitutional limitations open to question.
Part IV proposes an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
that could assuage penalty effects in the allocation of tax-exempt
status. This amendment would do little to solve ambiguities of un-
constitutional conditions doctrine or remove the potential for coer-
cive government subsidy decisions. Congress will always make
political distinctions between types of organizations that will be tax-
exempt. The proposed amendment could prevent the most coercive
and unconstitutional effects of legislative policy. The proposed
changes can also provide greater predictability to organizations
which risk losing tax-exempt status for engaging in a small propor-
tion of activity that government refuses to subsidize.
I. PROTECTED RIGHTS: ABORTION AND SPEECH
The debate among Members of Congress, interest groups, and
other members of the public reflects a variety of views on the consti-
tutional limitations to discriminatory tax treatment of abortion
providers. In general, the government cannot directly infringe on
fundamental constitutional rights in the absence of a compelling
state interest. 17 Yet, there is no governmental duty to fund the ex-
ercise of constitutional rights.18 Thus, the fundamental medical
vides for publicly financed hospital services without providing for similar services for
nontherapeutic abortions); Planned Parenthood v. Agency for Int'l. Dev., 915 F.2d 59 (2nd
Cir. 1990) (holding that restricting federal assistance to foreign nongovernmental organiza-
tions ["NGO's"] which perform abortions is constitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Arizona,
789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986) (withdrawing all funds to nongovernmental organizations that
perform abortion related services found unconstitutional where state can monitor and assure
that no state funds are used directly for abortion related services); Planned Parenthood v.
Arizona, 718 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that Arizona cannot unreasonably
interfere with Planned Parenthood's right to perform abortion related services, but the state
need not support these activities with funding).
17. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsrrruTIONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454 (2d ed.
1988).
18. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46 (holding that, while lobbying is a fundamental speech
right, the government is not obligated to subsidize it). See also Cammarano v. United States,
[Vol. 3:459
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provider's right to speak about abortion may be threatened by dis-
criminatory tax treatment. This speech right may not be infringed
upon without a compelling state interest.19 This section of the arti-
cle explores the strength of health care provider rights and the
equivalency of tax exemption and funding for the purpose of distin-
guishing between legitimate government subsidy decisions and leg-
islation which infringes on constitutionally protected rights.2 °
358 U.S. 498 (1959) (holding that tax deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses
must exclude lobbying expenditures).
19. In the absence of an implicated right, the state must only supply a rational relation
between legislation and a legitimate state interest. See TRIBE, supra note 17, § 16-33 at 1610-
1618. This was well understood by the drafters of the Humphrey Amendment legislation as
reported in a Republican Committee memorandum:
There is no right to a tax exemption, and other fundamental rights are searched for,
but not found .... [Therefore, the Court will apply the rational basis test which is
highly deferential to a legislative judgment.
Republican Policy Committee Memorandum, 133 CONG. REc. S2607, S2609 (daily ed. Feb.
26, 1987) (authored by Lincoln Oliphant, Legislative Counsel).
20. It can be argued that legislation to deny tax-exempt status of health care providers
would impinge on the health care provider's right to practice medicine. The existence of such
a right is subject to debate. On one hand, the right to practice medicine has been claimed to
fall under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roe v. Wade. 410
U.S. 113, 121 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197 (1973) ("The woman's right to receive
medical care in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's
right to administer it are substantially limited by [the Georgia statute requiring abortion
committee oversight prior to performance of abortion]"). In Roe, the Court first recognized
the physician's right to "administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment
up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for interven-
tion." Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). The Court has underscored the importance of
this right in subsequent decisions. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics & Gyne-
ology, 476 U.S. 747, (1986), partially overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816-17 (1992) (overruling those portions "inconsistent with Roe's
statement that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the
unborn"); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1983), partially
overruled on other grounds by Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17 (overruling those portions "incon-
sistent with Roe's statement that the state has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or
potential life of the unborn").
Yet, the Court has explained that the physician's right to practice medicine is wholly
derivative from patients' rights. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (holding that the doc-
tors' claim that the statute requiring prescriptions written for certain drugs to be reported to
the state impairs the doctors' right to practice medicine free of unwarranted state interference
is derivative from the patient's claim). In another context, the Court refused to recognize the
provider's medical practice rights:
The question of what rights the doctors may assert in seeking to resolve [the] con-
troversy is more difficult. The Court of Appeals adverted to what it perceived to be
the doctor's own "constitutional rights to practice medicine." We have no occasion
to decide whether such rights exist. Assuming that they do, the doctors, or course,
can assert them.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976) (citation omitted).
Commentators argue that there is no fundamental right to practice medicine. See James
Bopp, Jr., Protection of Disabled Newborns Are There Constitutional Limitations?, 1 Issuas
L. & MED. 173, 199 (1985) ("[T]here is no independent physician's right to practice medicine
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The First Amendment mandates that content-neutral speech
distinctions be used in subsidy determinations.21 In Arkansas Writ-
ers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,22 a state statute was annulled which
taxed general interest magazines but exempted newspapers and reli-
gious, professional and trade magazines "because the basis on
which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly re-
pugnant to First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status de-
pends entirely on its content."23 The Court determined that the
Arkansas statute was unconstitutional because it conditioned tax
exemption on content-based speech distinctions, inhibiting First
Amendment speech rights.24
protected by the Constitution"); Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the Right to Die, 49
MD. L. REv. 103, 120 (1990) ('The Court's discussion of the physician-patient aspect of
abortion should not be misconstrued, it does not signal the recognition of a constitutional
right to practice medicine .. "). See also Thomas L. Jipping, Informed Consent to Abor-
tion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 329, 351 (1988) ("In summary, then, the
federal courts no longer recognize an independent constitutionally significant 'fright to prac-
tice medicine' free from government interference. The Supreme Court provides no justifica-
tion for apparently resurrecting this notion within the abortion context while maintaining its
burial outside that context.")
If the physician's right to practice medicine does exist, it could likewise be threatened by
coercive government funding decisions. See infra note 94 (discussing constitutional signifi-
cance of funding decisions that implicate the provider's right to practice medicine).
21. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (holding
that content-based prohibition on monthly bill inserts by a government-regulated monopoly
infringes on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights). The Consolidated Court held that:
A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or manner of speech may be im-
posed so long as it is reasonable. But when regulation is based on the content of
speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that com-
munication has not been prohibited "merely because public officials disprove of the
speaker's views."
Id. at 536 (citation omitted).
See also F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 289, 295 (1984) (holding that park service
permit prohibiting sleeping, as a form of free speech in a demonstration for the homeless, is
reasonable and does not violate the First Amendment); Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (refusing to allow government subsidy of lobbying activities of
organization); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that renewal of non-ten-
ured public school teacher's one-year contract cannot be conditioned on exercise of First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (holding
that deduction of ordinary and necessary business deductions cannot include expenditures for
lobbying purposes); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (Black, J., concurring). But see
contra American Comm. Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (holding that conditioning
National Labor Relations Act benefits on the completion of "non-Communist" affidavits by
officers of labor organizations is constitutional).
22. 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding that content-based tax scheme of magazines and news-
papers is unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
23. Id at 229 (emphasis in original).
24. See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (holding that "special use" tax on paper and ink products used in newspaper
publishing is unconstitutional burden under the First Amendment).
[Vol. 3:459
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However, the concept of content-neutrality in Arkansas Writers'
is deceptively complicated. "'Content neutrality' is an umbrella
term that covers three different varieties of neutrality: viewpoint
neutrality, quality neutrality, and subject matter neutrality."25
While the state must always be viewpoint-neutral under the First
Amendment,2 6 the Constitution does not always require subject-
matter neutrality.27 The government may not interfere with consti-
tutional rights but there is no governmental duty to fund the exer-
cise of constitutional rights.
In Maher v. Roe,28 the Court explained that a government fund-
ing decision must: 1) disadvantage a suspect class, 2) impinge on a
fundamental right, or 3) lack rational relation to a constitutionally
25. Quality-based distinctions in grant allocation are similarly analyzed in cases chal-
lenging subsidy limitations in the arts. Lionel S. Sobel discussed that:
Artistic quality, of course, cannot be objectively measured; and there is a risk that
viewpoint considerations might influence- or even be disguised as -quality judg-
ments .... [However] the First Amendment permits subsidies to be awarded on the
basis of artistic quality ....
Lionel S. Sobel, First Amendment Standards for Government Subsidies of Artistic and Cul-
tural Expression: A Reply to Scalia and Renquist, 41 VAND. L. REv. 517, 527 (1988). See
also id. at 524.
26. Sobel explains the concept of "viewpoint neutrality" in a helpful manner:
[I]f the Corporation for Public Broadcasting were to award grants for the produc-
tion of documentaries about Central America, it could not constitutionally adopt as
a criterion for awarding such grants the requirement that funded documentaries
support, rather than criticize, President Reagan's opposition to the Nicaraguan
Sandinistas.
Id. at 525. See also F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-84 (1984), (invali-
dating § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 which forbids television and radio sta-
tions which received grants to "engage in editorializing").
Because speech on public issues lies "at the heart" and "on the highest rung" of First
Amendment issues, any viewpoint-based ban on editorializing is unconstitutional. Id. See
also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, the Court considered the First
Amendment right of a state college teacher who was terminated because he publicly criticized
the college administration. The Court explained that the government could not mandate a
sacrifice of free speech rights with a threat of loosing tenure:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person
has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government
may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in
freedom of speech.
Id. at 597. The Court reinstated the plaintiff because his discharge comprised a viewpoint-
based unconstitutional threat to his exercise of First Amendment speech rights. Id.
27. Subject matter distinctions are constitutional when tailored to advance compelling
state interests. See, eg., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), (upholding a prohi-
bition of obscene broadcast language because after applying strict scrutiny, a social interest in
morality outweighed broadcaster's First Amendment rights). See also Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
28. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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permissible purpose to be declared unconstitutional.29 The Maher
Court found that a Connecticut statute which denied funding for
indigent nontherapeutic abortions was constitutional because indi-
gent women do not comprise a suspect class, and there is no funda-
mental constitutional right to obtain an abortion.3" Further, the
Court held that the government is permitted to make value judg-
ments in allocating public funds.31 Funding childbirth to the exclu-
sion of abortion is constitutional as a rational means of promoting a
legitimate state interest in preserving the life of a fetus.32
Harris v. McRae33 provided the Court with another opportunity
to respond to Constitutional challenges to Congressional refusal to
fund abortions. Harris involved funding of certain medically neces-
sary abortions34 for indigent women under the Hyde Amendment
to Title XIX. In response to the contention that Medicaid funding
limitations interfered with a woman's Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess right to terminate her pregnancy, the Court identified a differ-
ence between "direct prevention" of a constitutionally protected
right to abortion and mere "encouragement of childbirth" through
funding choices.3 5 The Court underscored the rational relation be-
29. Id. at 470 (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)).
30. The Maher court interpreted Roe as preserving the right to make certain kinds of
decisions, free from government compulsion, not as establishing a fundamental right to abor-
tion. Id. at 473. While Maher exhibits the prevailing view, some maintain that Roe did
establish a fundamental right to abortion. Id. at 484-85 (Brennan, J. dissenting). See also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329-30 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Maher, 432 U.S. at 479.
32. The state interest in preserving the life of a fetus was identified in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Note that Fifth Amendment Equal Protection arguments usually fail with
respect to subsidy matters when a fundamental right is not involved. In Maher, an Equal
Protection argument failed because a discriminatory impact of the government funding deci-
sions was not established:
[a]n indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a conse-
quence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth .... The indigence that may
make it difficult - and in some cases, perhaps, impossible - for some women to have
abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.
Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
33. 448 U.S. 297 (holding constitutional severe limitations to Title XIX medicaid reim-
bursement for abortion procedures, including many medically necessary procedures under
the Hyde Amendment).
34. Petitioner's distinguished Harris (decision not to fund some medically necessary
abortions) from Maher (decision not to fund non-therapeutic abortions only) because an indi-
gent woman would have a more significant health interest in obtaining an abortion which is
medically necessary. Nevertheless, the Court held that a woman's freedom of choice does not
result in constitutional entitlement to a full range of medical resources. Id. at 317 n.19.
Further, the Court held that the Hyde Amendment did not violate Equal Protection guaran-
tees by reimbursing all medical services except medically necessary abortions. Id. at 297.
35. Id. at 314.
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tween legitimate government interests in promoting childbirth and
the funding priority of childbirth to the exclusion of abortion.
The most recent case involving abortion funding is Rust v. Sulli-
van. 36 Rust raises more unique constitutional questions because the
constitutional rights of abortion providers as well as indigent recipi-
ents were at issue before the Court. The case challenged the consti-
tutionality of Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
regulations prohibiting use of Title X funds for several purposes in-
cluding referral or counseling for abortion services, 37 encouraging,
promoting, or advocating abortion. 38 The regulations also man-
dated that Title X projects be physically and financially separate
from activities which are prohibited by the regulations.39
The Rust Court rejected the argument that the HHS regulations
violated the First Amendment speech rights of Title X grantees by
conditioning receipt of Title X funds on the sacrifice of protected
speech activity.' The Court extended the reasoning used in Harris
and Maher, finding the government entitled to define the scope of a
program funded with appropriated public funds.41 Because of the
distinction in scope between a Title X grantee42 and a Title X pro-
ject,4 3 project funding limitations involving abortion-related speech
36. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
37. Id. at 1765 (citing 42 C.F.R. 59.8 (1988)).
38. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (1988)).
39. Id. at 1466 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1988)).
40. 111 S.Ct. at 1774-76.
41. Id. at 1773. The scope of the Title X project was limited exclusively to "family
planning". Id. at 1765. "'Family planning' means the process of establishing objectives for
the number and spacing of one's children and selecting the means by which those objectives
may be achieved." Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1988). Family
planning services include a broad range of acceptable and effective methods to limit or en-
hance fertility; however, "family planning" does not include pregnancy, prenatal care, or
abortion services. Id. Although "it is clear that the Title X project must facilitate obtaining
the prenatal care necessary for a health pregnancy" referral for abortion is expressly prohib-
ited because it is not a method of "family planning." Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appro-
priated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a Method of Family Planning; Standard of
Compliance for Family Services Projects, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2926-27 (1988) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. § 59.2). The HHS regulations do not proscribe abortion referrals when "emer-
gency" circumstances dictate that a client be immediately referred to an "appropriate pro-
vider of emergency medical services." Id. at 2945.
42. A "grantee" is an organization which receives an award of funds from the govern-
ment. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2.
43. A program or project is a coherent assembly of plans, activities and supporting re-
sources contained within an administrative framework. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2. "The Department
believes that it is not supportable, in light of the legislative history ... to read the term
'program'. . . as relating to the funded organization as a whole." Statutory Prohibition on
Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a Method of Family Planning;
Standard of Compliance for Family Services Projects, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2927 (1988).
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leave grantees "unfettered" in the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected speech rights.44
The entire line of abortion funding cases demonstrates that the
courts are accommodating to state and federal spending powers. By
refusing to recognize indigent women as a suspect class or govern-
ment funded abortion as a fundamental right, minimal scrutiny ap-
plies and government refusal to fund abortion is permitted when
"rationally related" to a constitutionally permissible goal.45
Legislation to deny tax exemption to organizations which per-
form abortion may merit the same minimal degree of scrutiny as
applied in government funding decisions. In Regan v. Taxation
With Representation,' the Court upheld IRS regulations denying
section 501(c)(3) tax exemption to organizations which engage in
substantial lobbying. The Court explained that tax exemption and
funding are equivalent.47 By stating that, "[t]his Court has never
held that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR [Taxation
with Representation] claims here to a person who wishes to exercise
a constitutional right,"48 the Court established that tax exemption
enjoys no more constitutional protection than Congressional fund-
ing decisions.4 9
The tension between the government's constitutional duty to re-
frain from interfering with constitutional rights and the lack of duty
to subsidize constitutional rights has resulted in a unique body of
constitutional precedent. These concepts of unconstitutional condi-
tions can challenge Humphrey Amendment legislation on constitu-
tional grounds. Under some circumstances, unconstitutional
conditions analysis is more stringent than the "rational relation"
test used in abortion funding cases. Even if tax exemption is
equivalent to funding, some constitutional limitations apply to the
44. The Rust Court found that:
The Secretary's regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-
related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and
distinct from Title X activities. Title X expressly distinguishes between a Title X
grantee and a Title Xproject. The grantee, which normally is a health care organi-
zation, may receive funds from a variety of sources for a variety of purposes ....
The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activities, and leave the
grantee unfettered in its other activities.
111 S.Ct. at 1774 (emphasis added).
45. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (citations omitted).
46. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
47. In Regan, the court explained that "[both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are
a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system." Id. at 544.
48. Id. at 545.
49. See Leathers v. Medlock, IIl S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991) (holding that strict scru-
tiny was not triggered by content-neutral tax scheme).
[Vol. 3:459
1993] UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND ABORTION SUBSIDY 469
allocation of tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3). These un-
constitutional conditions cases are discussed in the following
section.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS
No single method has been used by the courts to distinguish
between unconstitutional conditions on government benefits and le-
gitimate government funding decisions.5 0 Several general concepts
emerge from the Court's analysis of constitutional challenges to
government subsidy distinctions. First, government cannot penal-
ize organizations beyond a mere refusal to fund a sphere of activity
in the absence of a compelling state interest."1 Second, government
mandated segregation of subsidized and non-subsidized activities
within organizations can avert an unconstitutional penalty effect.52
Third, the segregation of government funded and non-funded activi-
ties may comprise a further unconstitutional burden on the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights. The specific standard that dis-
tinguishes constitutional segregation burdens from unconstitution-
ally burdensome segregation is difficult to identify precisely.
Several cases provide some parameters.
Rust and Maher demonstrate that the government is free to
make funding decisions which are rationally related to a constitu-
50. See William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Condi-
tions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 243, 244 (1989). Mar-
shall explained the lack of "formula" to unconstitutional conditions analysis by denying the
existence of an unconstitutional conditions doctrine. He wrote that:
[b]ecause the government's remedial programs have touched virtually all areas of
social and economic life, the problem of unconstitutional conditions arises in a myr-
iad of contexts and affects the full spectrum of constitutional rights. Any attempt to
fashion a comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions would be quite far-
reaching. It would literally suggest a unifying theory cutting across all of constitu-
tional law. It is my conclusion that despite, or perhaps because of, its ambition the
search for a comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately
futile.
Id. (citation omitted).
51. However, the state may burden rights through subsidy distinctions when a compel-
ling state interest is advanced. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (conditioning
federal assistance on the execution of an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX's nondis-
crimination provision constitutional under the First Amendment because of compelling inter-
est); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (recognizing compelling state
interest where tax exempt status is conditioned on adherence to racially non-discriminatory
policy); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that commercial activity condi-
tioned on payment of Social Security contribution (violating religious belief) advanced a com-
pelling interest and was constitutional).
52. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).
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tionally permissible goal. The distinction between a refusal to fund
and a penalty 3 was recognized by the Harris Court. While a re-
fusal to subsidize abortion was a constitutional funding decision,
"[a] substantial, constitutional question would arise if Congress had
attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefitsfrom an otherwise eligi-
ble candidate simply because that candidate had exercised the consti-
tutionally protected freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion
... [b]ut the Hyde Amendment... does not provide for such a
broad disqualification from receipt of public benefits." 54
An unconstitutional penalty reaches beyond the scope of a fund-
ing decision to deter the exercise of constitutionally protected activ-
ities.55 The courts have characterized withdrawal of all benefits for
53. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415,
1499 (1989) ("Cases drawing a distinction between permissible 'nonsubsidies' and impermis-
sible 'penalties' often miss the point [that the government uses subsidy in ways that are coer-
cive to constitutional rights].").
54. Harris, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19 (emphasis added). A similar mode of analysis was
applied in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which held that the state may not with-
hold all unemployment benefits from an otherwise eligible claimant who refused to work on
the Sabbath.
55. This view was supported by Laurence Tribe (who argued before the Supreme Court
on behalf of Title X recipients in Rust v. Sullivan) in opposing early legislation to deny tax-
exempt status to organizations which perform abortion:
Senators should be aware that the amendment would, in all likelihood, violate the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment .... Although Congress is free to
withhold federal subsidy from the exercise of fundamental rights... and accord-
ingly may act to prevent institutions from using tax-deductible contributions to
fund such exercise.., it is equally well settled that "the government may not deny a
benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right" . . .. [Tihe
Humphrey amendment would not contain a proviso permitting hospitals and other
institutions to retain tax benefits for their other activities so long as they confine the
ineligible activities (i.e. performing or financing abortions) to controlled but distinct
affiliate entities.
132 CONG. REC. S14852 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (citations omitted).
Concern about the unconstitutional penalties that Tribe describes might have influenced
legislators to narrow the scope of legislation. Earlier legislation did not attempt to distin-
guish between organizations by the amount of total organizational activities that included
abortion. See infra note 96. Under early legislation, the denial of tax-exempt status would
apply equally to organizations which performed abortions exclusively and organizations
which provide abortion as a minuscule proportion of other health-related business. Id. This
could exclude from coverage many large hospitals and universities. By contrast, later legisla-
tion attempted to limit the application of a denial of tax-exempt status to organizations re-
ceiving more than one percent of gross receipts from abortions. Idr These changes could be
interpreted as a response to a powerful lobby of tax-exempt hospitals and universities. A
number of organizations expressed opposition to the earlier Humphrey Amendment includ-
ing: the Association of American Medical Colleges, the American Medical Association, the
Health Care Financial Management Association, Kaiser Permanente, the American Associa-
tion and Community and Junior Colleges, the Association of American Universities, Blue
Cross Blue Shield Association, the Volunteer Trustees of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, and the
American Psychological Association. 132 CONG. REc. S14850-57 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
While the one percent limitation might have satisfied lobbyists, Congressional legislation
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engaging in unrelated protected activity as an unconstitutional pen-
alty under other circumstances. In Speiser v. Randall, 56 the court
invalidated an oath57 prerequisite for a veterans' property tax ex-
emption. Justice Brennan explained that "[t]o deny an exemption
to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if
the State were to fine them for this speech."5"
Two cases demonstrate that a government condition exceeding
the scope of a government subsidy can also be construed as an un-
constitutional penalty. 9  In FC.C. v. League of Women Voters,6
the Court considered a ban on editorials by federally funded public
broadcasting stations.61  Public television stations were only par-
tially federally funded but the government ban applied to all activi-
ties (including those that were privately funded).62 The ban did not
provide for segregation of government funds and private funds, and
would be subject to an unconstitutional penalty challenge if applied to an organization that
receives greater than one percent of gross receipts from providing abortion.
56. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
57. The oath read "'I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate
the support of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities.'" Id. at
515.
58. Id. at 518.
59. See also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding
that, under the First Amendment, unemployment compensation cannot be denied to Seventh
Day Adventists who refuse to work on the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employ-
ment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that, under the First Amendment, unemploy-
ment compensation cannot be denied to a Jehovah's Witness who refuses to participate in the
production of armaments because it violated his religious beliefs); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that the renewal of a nontenured public school teacher's one-year
contract cannot be conditioned on exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that conditioning receipt of welfare benefits
on length of residence impinges on the fundamental right of interstate travel); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that, under the First Amendment, unemployment com-
pensation cannot be conditioned on Seventh Day Adventist's refusal to work on the Sabbath).
See generally Sullivan, supra note 53.
60. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
61. Id.
62. When the federal government attempted to justify limitations on editorializing with
an argument that conditions were constitutional under the Spending Power, the Court noted
that:
In this case, however, unlike the situation faced by the charitable organization in
Taxation With Representation [Regan v. Taxation With Representation], a noncom-
mercial educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income from [Fed-
eral] grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing. Therefore, in contrast to the
appellee in Taxation With Representation, such a station is not able to segregate its
activities according to the source of funding. The station has no way of limiting the
use of its Federal funds to all noneditorializing activities, and more importantly, it is
barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity.
Id. at 400.
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it was invalidated as an unconstitutional condition on speech rights
of broadcasters.6 3
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood v. Arizona, 4 family planning
organizations in Arizona challenged the constitutionality of a provi-
sion in a state appropriations bill which prohibited the use of state
welfare funds to support organizations that perform abortions and
engage in abortion related activities.65 The court found that Ari-
zona's legislation was unconstitutional because the regulation en-
compassed a condition broader in scope than the state subsidy."
While the state need not support abortion and abortion related ac-
tivities with subsidy, the state may not unreasonably interfere with
an organization's right to engage in abortion or abortion related
speech.67 The language in the state legislation was too broad to be
held constitutional:
The statute withheld all state funds from nongovernmental enti-
ties offering "abortions, abortion procedures, counseling for
abortion procedures or abortion referrals." A more narrowly
drawn statute, which would accomplish the stated purpose of en-
suring that state funds not be spent on activities the state legisla-
ture disfavors, would simply forbid entities receiving state funds
from using those funds for abortions and the related activities
listed above. 68
The court held that the legislation imposed a penalty, as in Speiser,
on constitutionally protected rights.69  However, Planned
Parenthood dicta suggests that more narrowly tailored legislation
63. Id. at 400, 402.
64. 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 944-45.
67. Id. The court rejected the state's argument that state funding could be denied be-
cause state funding of activities not related to abortion would "free up" private or federal
funds for abortion activity. Id at 945. The court concluded that a state cannot justify with-
drawing all state funds from otherwise eligible entities because non-state funds might be real-
located to less preferred activities. Id A denial of funding for all activities constitutes an
unconstitutional penalty to organizations which perform constitutionally protected activities.
The court further stated that:
It can be argued that by providing welfare benefits to a pregnant indigent woman, a
state would be freeing up whatever other funds she may have at her disposal for use
in paying for an abortion. Thus, the freeing-up argument, when coupled the hold-
ing in Maher... would lead to the conclusion that a state could refuse all medicaid
benefits to an otherwise eligible applicant because she had exercised her right to
have an abortion. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed such a situa-
tion, the Court ... implied that such a statute would impose an unconstitutional
penalty on the Medicaid recipient.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 945.
69. Id. (holding that statutes which withdraw all funding from otherwise eligible enti-
ties, such as Medicaid, may infringe upon constitutionally protected rights).
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would survive constitutional scrutiny.7"
Unconstitutional penalty effects have been upheld when ration-
ally related to a legislative goal. In American Communications
Ass'n. v. Douds,7 1 the Court upheld a provision in the National La-
bor Relations Act denying certain benefits to labor organizations
whose officers do not fie "non-communist" affidavits with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. The Court held that:
[w]hen particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public
order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, par-
tial abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater pro-
tection under the particular circumstances presented .... Legiti-
mate attempts to protect the public, not from the remote possible
effects of noxious ideologies, but from present excesses of direct,
active conduct, are not presumptively bad because they interfere
with and, in some of its manifestations, restrain the exercise of
First Amendment rights.72
While Douds arguably resulted from cold war culture rather than
thorough unconstitutional conditions analysis, it presents an exam-
ple of permissible penalty effects in the allocation of government
benefits.73 When the penalty effect on an activity is either attenu-
ated or partial, perhaps a "rational relation" to constitutional goals
or a "balancing" of constitutional rights and legislative rationale
may suffer to justify an otherwise unconstitutional penalty. Thus,
the constitutionality of penalty effects may depend on whether or
not a penalty effect is considered substantial, as in League of
Women Voters, 74 or merely attenuated, as in Douds.
What might appear to be an unconstitutional penalty could be
avoided if it is possible to segregate subsidy used for preferred and
unpreferred activities. Planned Parenthood and League of Women
Voters suggest that the ability to segregate government funded ac-
tivities from non-funded activities is critical to the state's ability to
attach conditions to subsidy, while avoiding forbidden conditions
on private funds.7" This concept was explored by the Court in
70. Id. (suggesting that a statute could be drawn which permits state funds to go to
nongovernmental organizations which perform abortion-related services if the funds do not
subsidize abortions and other related activities).
71. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
72. Id. at 399.
73. While Douds has not been explicitly overruled, the Court has grown more protective
of speech rights in recent decades. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
74. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
75. See id. When segregation of preferred and unpreferred activities is not possible, the
public policy and compelling state interests can allow a denial of subsidy which is larger in
scope than an unpreferred activity. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983),
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Regan v. Taxation With Representation. 76 In Regan, the Court up-
held IRS regulations prohibiting organizations with tax-exempt sta-
tus under section 501(c)(3) from engaging in substantial lobbying, a
right guaranteed by the First Amendment. By allowing organiza-
tions to maintain an affiliate for lobbying, which could be tax-ex-
empt under section 501(c)(4), Congress merely "chose not to
subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose to subsidize other activ-
ities that nonprofit organizations undertake to promote the public
welfare."77 One commentator surmised that:
Had Congress denied Taxation With Representation tax benefits
for its nonlobbying activities on account of its lobbying, the
Court might well have invalidated the condition by analogy to
Speiser, but section 501(c)(4) prevented that result. Without that
section, nonprofit organizations that exercised their constitu-
tional right to lobby would have been penalized for their lobby-
ing by losing all tax benefits for their nonlobbying activities. In
other words, withholding subsidies of nonlobbying activities on
account of lobbying activiti2s is constitutionally forbidden, but
Taxation With Representation [Regan v. Taxation With Repre-
sentation] held that the tax code did not impose such a penalty. 78
In Rust, the Court upheld regulations prohibiting abortion
counseling within the scope of the Title X activity funded by the
federal government. 79  Because the federal funding was "project
based," a refusal to fund abortion-related speech was not an uncon-
stitutional penalty. 0 The court stated, "Title X expressly distin-
guishes between a Title X grantee and a Title X project.""s While a
Title X grantee may engage in abortion related speech, the grantee
must conduct that speech separately from projects that receive Title
X funds.8 2 The court distinguished unconstitutional conditions
cases from Rust because, "our 'unconstitutional conditions' cases
involve situations in which the government has placed a condition
on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program
or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging
racially discriminatory admissions policies and school rules which forbade interracial mar-
riage could not be segregated from the tax-exempt activities of the University. While the
Court did not consider any argument that the IRS ruling comprised a penalty on otherwise
eligible activities, the decision may suggest that especially egregious violations of public pol-
icy may be subject to larger penalty effects. See id
76. 461 U.S. 540 (1973).
77. Id. at 544.
78. Sullivan, supra note 53 at 1465 (citations omitted).
79. Rust, III S.Ct. 1759.
80. Id
81. Idt at 1774. See supra notes 46-48.
82. Id.
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in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded
program."83 The severability of operations in a Title X project
from other grantee activities allows a government "funding" deci-
sion to escape constitutional limitations under the First or Fifth
Amendments.
While the government may mandate segregation of activities,
mandated segregation of subsidized and unsubsidized activities
could be unconstitutionally burdensome. The permissible bounda-
ries of unconstitutional and constitutional segregation are roughly
sketched in two recent cases. In Regan, the Court mandated segre-
gation of lobbying and non-lobbying activities into separate organi-
zations. This segregation was approved by the Court because
Taxation With Representation ["TWR"] was originally formed by
fusing two separate organizations:
One, Taxation With Representation Fund, was organized to pro-
mote TWR's goals by publishing a journal and engaging in litiga-
tion; it had tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3). The other,
Taxation With Representation, attempted to promote the same
goals by influencing legislation; it had tax-exempt status under
501(c)(4)8 4
The segregation of lobbying and non-lobbying activities in order to
maintain tax-exempt status merely required TWR to return to the
dual structure which it used in the past.8"
By contrast, in FE. C. v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.,86
the Court identified factors that can make segregation so burden-
some that it infringes on constitutionally protected speech rights.
Massachusetts Citizen For Life (MCFL) challenged F.E.C. guide-
83. Id. (citations omitted).
84. 461 U.S. 540, 543 (footnote omitted). The court continued by explaining that:
For purposes of our analysis, there are two principal differences between § 501(c)(3)
organizations and § 501(c)(4) organizations. Taxpayers who contribute to
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 170(c)(2) to deduct the amount of their
contributions on their federal income tax returns, while contributions to § 501(c)(4)
organizations are not deductible. Section 501(c)(4) organizations, but not
§ 501(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying to ad-
vance their exempt purposes.
Id.
85. Id. at 544. Note that the "dual structure" of 501(c)(3) and (4) organizations has
been subject to Congressional criticism. Lobbying and Political Activities of Tax-exempt Or-
ganizations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means House of Rep., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-10, 64-70 (1987) (statements of Chairman J.J.
Pickle and Mr. Hopkins).
86. 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that Federal Election Campaign Act § 316, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b (1988), prohibiting corporations from using treasury funds to make an expenditure
"in connection with" any federal election unless financed by voluntary contributions segre-
gated into a separate fund, was an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment speech
rights).
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lines which imposed additional organizational and reporting re-
quirements on campaign funds generated by incorporated
organizations.8 7 The court found that additional regulations cre-
ated unconstitutional disincentives to political speech because,
"[d]etailed record-keeping and disclosure obligations, along with
the duty to appoint a treasurer and custodian of the records, impose
administrative costs that many small entities may be unable to bear.
Furthermore, such duties require a far more complex and formal-
ized organization than many small groups could manage."" The
segregation guidelines advanced no compelling government interest
in the context of non-profit organizations.89 The minority con-
cluded that:
Thus, while § 441b does not remove all opportunities for in-
dependent spending by organizations such as MCFL, the avenue
it leaves open is more burdensome than the one it forecloses.
87. The Court explained that the differential treatment of incorporated and unincorpo-
rated organizations under the FEC rules was not inconsequential:
If it were not incorporated, MCFL's obligations under the Act would be those spec-
ified by § 434(c)... [they would need to] (1) identify all contributors who contrib-
ute in a given year over $200 in the aggregate in funds to influence elections; (2)
disclose the name and address of recipients of independent expenditures exceeding
$200 in the aggregate, along with an indication of whether the money was used to
support or oppose a particular candidate; and (3) identify any persons who make
contributions over $200 that are earmarked for the purpose of furthering expendi-
tures... [blecause it is incorporated, however, MCFL must establish a "separate
segregated fund" if it wishes to engage in any independent spending whatsoever.
Since such a fund is considered a "political committee" ... all MCFL independent
expenditure activity is, as a result, regulated as though the organization's major
purpose is to further the election of candidates. This means that MCFL must com-
ply with several requirements in addition to those mentioned. Under § 432, it must
appoint a treasurer, ensure that contributions are forwarded within 10 or 30 days of
receipt, depending on the amount of the contribution; see that its treasurer keeps an
account of every contribution regardless of amount. the name and address of any
person who makes a contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from
political committees, and the name and address of any person to whom a disburse-
ment is made regardless of amount, and preserve receipts for all disbursements over
$200 and all records for three years. Under § 433, MCFL must file a statement of
organization containing its name, address, the name and address of its custodian of
records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositories; must report any
change in the above information within 10 days; and may dissolve only upon filing a
written statement ....
Under § 434, MCFL must file ... monthly reports with the FEC .... [t]hese
reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total
amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each
political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making con-
tributions.... In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segre-
gated fund only from its "members"....
Id at 252-54 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 254-55.
89. Cf Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (comparing
non-profit status of Massachusetts Citizens for Life against Michigan Chamber of
Commerce).
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The fact that the statute's practical effect may be to discourage
protected speech is sufficient to characterize § 441b as an in-
fringement on First Amendment activities. 90
Varying degrees of burdensome segregation exist between ex-
tremes presented in Regan and Massachusetts Citizens For Life. For
example, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,91 state fund
segregation requirements similar to those invalidated in Massachu-
setts Citizens For Life were upheld. The Court distinguished the
state interest in segregation of campaign funds in Austin and Massa-
chusetts Citizens For Life on three factors: MCFL was a voluntary
political organization rather than a business firm like the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce (MCC), MCFL was a narrowly focused or-
ganization92 whereas MCC had a wide organizational focus,93 and
MCC received a majority of contributions from businesses as op-
posed to private citizens who provided the majority of financial sup-
port to MCFL.94 Thus, state campaign fund segregation
requirements were less burdensome on MCC and more justifiable
given compelling state interests against corruption and distortion of
the political process.95
While the Rust case presented ample opportunity to address fur-
ther the degree of burdensome segregation between subsidized and
unsubsidized activities which may be imposed without violating the
constitution, the Court neglected to address this issue with any de-
gree of specificity. The HHS regulations upheld in Rust stated that,
"[a] title X project must be organized so that it is physically and
financially separate ... from activities which are prohibited under
*.. the Act... and regulations" and that physical and financial
separateness includes "objective integrity and independence from
prohibited activities. Mere bookkeeping separation of Title X funds
90. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 255.
91. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
92. According to MCFL by-laws the focus of the organization was "'[t]o foster respect
for human life and to defend the right to life for all human beings.'" Id. at 656 (quoting
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 241-42).
93. The articles of incorporation of MCC set forth that the organization was intended
"to promote economic conditions favorable to private enterprise; to analyze, compile, and
disseminate information about laws of interest to the business community". Id. at 656. The
comparitively narrow focus of MCFL allowed for a finding that none of the compelling inter-
ests set forth by the legislature applied to MCFL. By contrast, challenges to legislation based
on unconstitutional penalty attempt to demonstrate a wide organizational focus (including a
variety of charitable activities) which are penalized by a denial of total organizational tax-
exempt status.
94. Id. at 664.
95. Id. at 666-69.
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from other monies is not sufficient." 96 It is certain that the HHS
regulations require some greater degree of segregation than man-
dated by the Court in Regan. But, these vague regulations avoid
unconstitutional conditions issues encountered in Massachusetts
Citizens For Life because the appointment of officers, detailed rec-
ord-keeping, and other activities which increase costs beyond what
a small organization could bear are not specifically required.
The question of what degree of stringency will be constitution-
ally tolerated is one for future debate and commentary. Unconsti-
tutional conditions challenges to mandated segregation of
subsidized and unsubsidized activities would address these un-
resolved issues. In the next part, the concepts of unconstitutional
conditions will be applied to the Humphrey Amendments and simi-
lar legislation.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND
ABORTION SUBSIDY
While Congressional legislation has been introduced to limit the
tax-exempt status of abortion providers, 97 there have been no spe-
96. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1988).
97. One early amendment to the 1987 appropriations bill is typical of early legislation.
Amendment No. 3183 read in relevant part:
SEC.. DENIAL OF TAX BENEFITS FOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PER-
FORM, FINANCE, OR PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR ABORTIONS.
(a) DENIAL OF TAX-EXEMPT STATus.-Section 501 (relating to exemption
from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc.) is amended by redesignating sub-
section (m) as subsection (n) and by inserting after subsection (1) the following
new subsection:
"(m) DENIAL OF EXEMPTION FOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PERFORM, FI-
NANCE, OR PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR ABORTIONS.-AH organization shall not
be treated as described in subsection (a) if such organization performs, fi-
nances, or provides facilities for any abortion, except where the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term."
(b) DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION.-
(1) INCOME TAx.-Section 170(c) (defining charitable contribution) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the follwoing: "For the purposes of
this section, such term does not include a contribution or gift to or for the
use of any organization which performs, finances, or provides facilitites
for any abortion (within the meaning of section 501(m))."
132 CONG. REc. S14844 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (emphasis added) (proposal of Amendment
No. 3184 by Sen. Hatfield). Later legislation is exemplified by S.1513 which read in relevant
part:
SECTION 1. DENIAL OF TAX BENEFITS FOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH
PERFORM OR PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR ABORTIONS.
(a) DENIAL OF TAX-EXEMPT STATus.-Section 501 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (relating to exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts,
etc.) is amended by redesignating subsection (n) as subsection (o) and inserting
after subsection (m) the following new subsection:
"(n) DENIAL OF EXEMPTION FOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH PERFORM OR
PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR ABORTIONS.-
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cific proposals to deny tax exemption to organizations that perform
abortion counseling. Any legislation limiting tax-exempt status of
organizations involved in abortion services can be challenged with
unconstitutional conditions theories. The success of unconstitu-
tional conditions challenges depends on two variables. The first va-
riable is the scrutiny triggered by the threatened constitutional
right.9" The second variable is the type of organization affected by
the legislation. The existence of an unconstitutional penalty effect
will depend on organizational attributes such as organizational his-
tory, size, and the proportion of abortion-related activity compared
to nonabortion charitable activity performed. This analysis demon-
strates few predictable outcomes of judicial scrutiny in unconstitu-
tional conditions cases. 99
Legislation which denies tax-exempt status to organizations that
"(1) IN GENERAL-An organization shall not be treated as described in
subsection (a) for any taxable year if for such year such organization re-
ceived more than 1 percent of its gross receipts from performing abortions or
providing facilities for abortions.
"(2) RECEIPTS FROM CERTAIN ABORTIONS EXCLUDED.-In determining
gross receipts under paragraph (1), gross receipts from abortions per-
formed when the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term shall not be considered ".
(b) DENIAL OF ELIGIBILITY FOR CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION.-
(1) INCOME TAX.-Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(defining charitable contribution) is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following: "For purposes of this section, such term does not include a
contribution or gift to or for the use of any organization which is not
treated as an organization described in section 501(a) by reason of section
501(n).".
S.1513, 101st Cong., st Sess. § 1 (1989) (emphasis added).
The evolution of the scope of activities contemplated by this legislation demonstrates an
understanding of the constitutionally protected rights of health care providers. If a provider's
right to practice medicine is recognized, it would most clearly be infringed by a prohibition of
abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Legislation limiting abortion subsidy
has historically made exceptions for endangered mothers' lives. The regulations upheld in
Rust included exceptions to general rules of non-subsidy in life threatening cases. Regula-
tions did address abortion which threatens the life of the mother, "[in cases in which emer-
gency care is required, however, the Title X project shall be required only to refer the client
immediately to an appropriate provider of emergency medical services." 40 CFR 59.8
(1988). In Rust, the court noted that they did not read the regulations to bar abortion refer-
ral in the case that a woman's pregnancy places her life in "imminent peril." I ll S.Ct at
1773. The Court further noted that, "Section 59.5(b)(1) also requires Title X projects to
provide necessary referral to other medical facilities when medically indicated." Id.
98. See supra, Part I and Part II.
99. This argument assumes that both speech and abortion rights will continue to be
defined as charitable activity under section 501(c)(3). Section 501(c)(3) is designed to subsi-
dize charitable activity. If any activity is inherently uncharitable, tax-exempt status may be
constitutionally denied.
In general, organizations that engage in illegal activity are excluded per se from tax ex-
emption under § 501(c)(3)-(4). In a 1975 Revenue Ruling, the IRS considered the tax exempt
status of an anti-.war protest organization which urged demonstrators to "deliberately block
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vehicular or pedestrian traffic, disrupt the work of government, and prevent the movement of
supplies." Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204. The ruling concluded that:
Illegal activities, which violate the minimum standards of acceptable conduct neces-
sary to the preservation of an orderly society, are contrary to the common good and
general welfare of the people in the community and thus are not a permissible
means of promoting the social welfare for purposes of Section 501(c)(4) of the code.
Id See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,800 (Nov. 6, 1989) (finding that an organization described
under 501(c)(3) did not violate the fundamental federal public policy of the Establishment
Clause); Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,264 (Jan. 30, 1980) (finding that a section 501(cX4) organiza-
tion will lose its exemption if it engages in illegal activities); Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,251 (Dec.
31, 1979) (finding that an organization, whose primary activity is the promotion of social
welfare, will affect its exempt status under section 501(cX4) if it engages in political cam-
paigns for public office); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,153 (Jan. 31, 1975) (finding that "an organiza-
tion that plans and supports acts of civil disobedience" does not qualify for exempt status
under sections 501(cX3) or 501(cX4)). Cf. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,415 (June, 1980) (finding
that an organization which educates the public on environmental issues and which also en-
gages in nonviolent confrontation activities relating to the hunting of endangered species can
retain its exempt status under section 501(cX3)) (organizations are not accountable for the
unauthorized illegal acts of members).
Activities which are contrary to public policy are also generally not tax-exempt. In Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the Court upheld an IRS ruling which
denied tax-exempt status to a school with racially discriminatory policies. The Court found
that:
Section 501(c)(3)... must be analyzed and construed within the framework of the
Internal Revenue Code and against the background of congressional purposes.
Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant
parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meet-
ing certain common-law standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established
public policy.
Id at 586. The court also quoted century-old precedent that "it has now become an estab-
lished principal of American law, that courts of chancery will sustain and protect.., a gift
... to public charitable uses, provided the same is consistent with local laws and public policy
. ...." Id at 588 (quoting Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501, 26 L. Ed. 701 (1861) (emphasis
added by the Court). In Bob Jones Univ., the long history, compelling public policy, and law
against racial discrimination sufficed as justification for a denial of tax-exempt status which
burdened religious freedom. The court stated that "the Government has a fundamental,
overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education .... [t]hat governmental
interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioner's
exercise of their religious beliefs." Id at 604. The compelling public policy against racial
discrimination in education justified a denial of tax-exempt status despite the of resulting
burden on constitutionally protected religious beliefs.are denied exemption under § 501(cX3).
If abortion were made illegal, or viewed as contrary to public policy, these rationales
could support denying tax-exempt status to abortion providers. In the future, barriers to
discriminatory tax treatment of organizations which engage in abortion counseling could
hang in the balance an increasingly conservative Court and legality of abortion. The effect of
the overruling of Roe on public policy regarding abortion may well depend on the thorough-
ness of the Court's denouncement and subsequent reaction within state legislatures. See also
Cynthia Gorney, Endgame, WASH. PosT, Feb. 23, 1992, at w6. If Roe is overruled and a
substantial number of states criminalize abortion, "public policy" could be swayed against
abortion. For the moment, abortion and abortion counseling have not been classified as
either illegal or uncharitable activities. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791
(1992).
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perform abortion counseling could be found unconstitutional"° be-
cause different tax treatment of speech favoring and opposing abor-
tion would be a viewpoint-based distinction triggering strict
scrutiny.01 A subject-matter prohibition on all abortion-related
speech 02 could be viewed as permissible if legislation were nar-
rowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest.10 3 However, a
statute which conditioned tax-exempt status on a subject matter
prohibition could be broad enough to survive strict scrutiny. The
state has no compelling interest in burdening speech rights of health
care providers who discourage abortion. If the Court defined advo-
cating abortion as a distinct subject matter, a denial of exemption
could be upheld on the grounds that it advances the compelling
state interest in protecting fetal life."°
Nonetheless, "[l]egislatures have especially broad latitude in
creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes." 10 5 Victor
100. It is interesting that legislation introduced in Congress (aimed at limiting tax-exempt
status of organizations which perform abortion) was clearly drafted to avoid First Amend-
ment issues. The following passage from the Senate debate reads:
Mr. STEVENS .... In other words, if it is to be tax justice, should the Right to
Life Committee and all those churches and others who oppose abortions similarly
be denied their tax-exempt status?
Mr. Armstrong ... the Humphrey Amendment was has been carefully crafted, let
me say to my friend, not to go to the question of advocating abortion. You can
advocate abortion 24 hours a day, 7 days a week without losing your tax-exempt
status. And, in exactly the same way, people who are against abortions enjoy a tax-
exempt status in some cases ....
132 CONG. REc. S14848 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
A Republican Policy Committee memorandum of Legislative Counsel also demonstrates
that an aversion to legislation which would deny tax-exempt status for abortion-related
speech. 133 CONG. REc. S2607-10 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1987). While the memo concludes that
legislation which limits the exemption of abortion providers would be unconstitutional, "were
Congress to attempt to revoke the tax-exemption of a group for its lawful, abortion-related
speech, serious-and probably insurmountable-First Amendment problems would arise." Id.
at S2610.
101. See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); F.C.C. v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). See supra pp. 11-13.
102. The protection afforded to the right of an abortion provider to freely practice
medicine, if recognized, would enjoy a lesser degree of constitutional protection than speech
rights. The physician's right to practice medicine does not enjoy the weight of precedent
given the right of free speech. See supra note 20.
103. This "subject matter prohibition" could be seen as analogous to the government
refusal to subsidize lobbying with tax-exemption illustrated in Regan v. Taxation With Rep-
resentation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
104. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding Mis-
souri law which conditioned use of public employees, facilities, and funds to perform, assist,
or "counsel and encourage" upon the choice not to have an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). Compelling interest could be justified as a "moral" interest, as exhibited in Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 178 U.S. 186 (1986).
105. Regan, 461 U.S. at 547.
HEALTH MATRIX
Rosenblum16 maintains that legislation to deny tax-exempt status
to organizations that perform abortion is constitutional.1 0 7 Accord-
ing to Rosenblum, Congressional discretion is nearly limitless in the
absence of an implicated fundamental right:
Although it is established constitutional doctrine that a Congres-
sional penalty on constitutionally protected acts is not sustaina-
ble, the Justices ... concluded that refusal to fund or subsidize
abortions did not constitute such a penalty .... The applicable
tax cases seem to me entirely compatible with this view. Tax
exemptions have been treated as subsidies, not as penalties...
and the discretion of Congress in formulating tax policy has, if
anything, been deemed greater than in formulating other legisla-
tive policies.10
8
American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds1 9 provides a similarly
sobering warning. In Douds, the Court found that a content-based
distinction resulting in attenuated or partial effect on constitutional
rights only required "rational relation" of legislation to constitu-
tional goals."' Under Douds analysis, even viewpoint-based dis-
tinctions in tax treatment could be upheld.
Unconstitutional conditions doctrine is integral to the analysis
of legislation implicating organizations that engage in either abor-
tion counseling in addition to other tax-exempt activities. A denial
of tax-exempt status under these circumstances could be invalidated
as an unconstitutional penalty. Tax exemption differs from funding
because it applies to an entire organization, rather than a smaller
"project." If organizations are denied tax-exempt status for all ac-
tivities rather than ineligible activities, a denial of tax-exempt status
could amount to a penalty on constitutionally protected speech
rights.
The ultimate success of this argument could rest on two factors.
Primarily, the relative strength of the speech right as compared
with the Congressional latitude to formulate tax policy could make
a speech penalty repugnant to the courts. Secondly, the specific ra-
tio of abortion-related speech and other charitable activity that an
106. Rosenblum is a Law Professor at Northwestern University who argued in support of
the Hyde Amendment before the Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
132 CONG. REc. S14845 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
107. 132 CONG. REC. S14845 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
108. Id.
109. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
110. Id Title X regulations considered in Rust were not completely viewpoint neutral.
The HHS regulations permitted project family planning funds to be used for referral for
prenatal care, but not referral for abortion. 42 CFR 59.8 (1988). This argument apparently
was not advanced by the appellees or considered by the Court.
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organization performs would be integral to a court's finding. A
penalty effect may be viewed as attenuated or insignificant if legisla-
tion only penalizes a small percentage of charitable tax-exempt ac-
tivity.111 By contrast, the most recent Humphrey Amendments
exempts organizations which derive less than one percent of gross
receipts from performing or providing facilities for abortion.112 To
avoid the unconstitutional penalty effect, legislation should be lim-
ited to organizations which perform a small percentage of unre-
lated, charitable, tax-exempt activity, rather than a small
percentage of abortion related activity.
As exemplified in Regan v. Taxation With Representation,1 3 the
government could establish a procedure for affiliate organizations to
avoid an unconstitutional condition on the allocation of the sub-
sidy.'1 4 By confining ineligible activities to a separate project or af-
filiate organization (denied tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3)), legislation would no longer impose an unconstitutional
penalty effect.' 15
The organizational scope of tax exemption makes segregation of
subsidized and unsubsidized activity inherently more complex. If
segregation is impossible, and the penalty effect is substantial, legis-
lation would trigger strict scrutiny by the Court, and would likely
be invalidated as an unconstitutional condition under F C. C. v.
League of Women Voters. 1 6 If the penalty effect is attenuated or
partial, American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds would require a
mere "rational relation" of legislation to constitutionally permissi-
ble purposes.1 1 7 Unfortunately, the critical distinction between a
substantial and partial penalty effect may be a matter of political
111. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 397-400 (holding that legislation which impacts First
Amendment freedoms will be upheld if the effect is relatively small and the public interest at
issue is substantial).
112. See infra note 97.
113. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
114. See Rust, 111 S.Ct. 1759 (upholding equivalent segregation). See also 48 C.F.R.
§ 59.9 (1988) (mandating segregation of funded activities from unfunded activities); Regan,
461 U.S. 540.
115. The procedure for affiliate organizations discussed in Regan has been subject of con-
gressional inquiry and criticism. See generally, Lobbying and Political Activities of Tax-ex-
empt Organizations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); SUBCOMMITrEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS U.S. HousE OF REPS.; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 100TH
CONG., 1sT SEss. (Comm. Print June 8, 1987).
116. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
117. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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influence rather than law.11
The remaining question is exactly how burdensome the segrega-
tion of activities must be before segregation of abortion-related ac-
tivities and other charitable activities becomes an infringement of
constitutionally protected rights. A variety of analyses could apply
to determine the threshold burden which is constitutionally permit-
ted. The burdensomeness of segregation may depend on the degree
of segregation between abortion related and other activities prior to
regulations, as exemplified by Regan.119 Due to the nature of
speech, the functional segregation of abortion-related speech may be
oppressive.
Under Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 120 segregation
requirements will be upheld if justified by compelling state interests
against funding abortion related activity. Recall that Austin was
distinguished from FE. C. V Massachusetts Citizens For Life 121 by
virtue of organizational attributes which increased the burden of
compliance with legislation. Therefore, the type of organization
118. "The men wear white coats, like those worn by doctors or scientists .... [Each has
a placard hung around his neck to show why he has been executed: a drawing of a human
foetus. They were doctors, then, in a time before, when such things were legal." MARGARET
ATwOOD, A HANDMAID'S TALE 42 (1985). Cf Floor Statement of Senator Humphrey, 135
CONG. REc. S9952 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1989)("Abortion is just plain wrong. Let's cut out the
sophistry. Abortion kills human beings. That's why its wrong. The offspring of human be-
ings are human beings, and abortion kills human beings... the debate isn't about religion at
all, its about biology. And you don't have to hold a Ph.D. to know the offspring of human
beings are human beings.")
119. In Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984), the author focuses on the fact that returning
to historical past practices may be less burdensome than forcing organizations to establish
unprecedented organizational structures. Kreimer distinguishes between offers and threats to
determine if a condition on government subsidy is unconstitutional. Id at 1300-01. Kreimer
hypothesizes that the available range of choices expanded by offers or limited by threats
depends on how the range of choices is originally defined. Id. Three baselines demonstrate
the distinctions between unconstitutional threats and offers. Id. at 1352. The historical base-
line focusses on the difference between past and present benefits schemes. Id at 1361. In the
same manner, changing past practices is perceived as less coercive than other interference.
Id. at 1362. To exemplify this theory he writes that "[i]f for each of the last twenty years the
mayor has provided city patronage to the advertising department of a newspaper, the threat
to stop doing so unless the newspaper changes its editorial policy would legitimately be
viewed as coercion."
In Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Con-
sent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988), the author criticizes Kreimer's approach by explaining
that, "Kreimer's inability to offer a single baseline for assessing conditional government bene-
fits renders his account problematic." Id. at 13. Epstein continued by stating that one of
Kreimer's baselines can make certain conditions seem acceptable whereas another baseline,
when applied to the same issue may make the condition unconstitutional. Id.
120. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
121. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
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challenging burdensome segregation might affect the Court's deter-
mination of penalty effects. 122  By attempting to reconcile the con-
flicts presented by cases addressing the unconstitutional burdens of
mandated segregation of tax-exempt and nonexempt functions, the
Court will have a significant role in clarifying the hierarchy of con-
stitutional rights for decades to come.12 3 In the meantime, tax-ex-
empt organizations face uncertainty of future outcomes.
A number of prominent legal scholars have attempted to give
these concepts of unconstitutional conditions more definition and
clarity. Some authors find a critical difference between an "offer" of
government benefits and a "threat" to withdraw benefits condi-
tioned on engaging in or refraining from a certain activity. 124
Others find that the germaneness of a condition to an allocated ben-
122. Segregation requirements could be more coercive to small organizations funded by
private contributions, as compared to larger organizations with more developed administra-
tive structures. This idea is reflected in another Kreimer "baseline," that of equality, which
accounts for the disparate effects of conditions on benefit allocation on different organiza-
tions; "[e]ven if there were no history of public advertising, the mayor's decision not to place
advertising in one paper while placing it in all the others looks significantly different from a
decision not to place ads." Kreimer, supra note 119, at 1363.
Kreimer's equality baseline reflects similar concerns expressed in Sullivan's distinctions
between horizontal and vertical social relationships. Sullivan and Kreimer both argue that
discriminatory subsidies should be invalidated because its negatively effects equality between
viewpoints and individuals. Sullivan would contend that legislation denying tax-exempt sta-
tus would change the distribution of rights among right holders:
Unconstitutional conditions inherently classify potential beneficiaries into two
groups: those who comply with the condition and those who do not .... Which
constitutional rights entail such obligations of government evenhandedness? Speech
is the paradigm example. If government could freely use benefits to shift viewpoints
in a direction favorable to the existing regime, democratic self-government would be
undermined. The view that government must treat speakers evenhandedly under-
lies the Court's consistent statements in unconstitutional conditions challenges that
benefit conditions predicated on viewpoint discrimination are void.
Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1496 (citations omitted). The relative position of benefit recipients
who elect to exercise their rights compared to those who elect to relinquish their rights can
indicate an unconstitutional threat to constitutionally guaranteed rights. The range of op-
tions available to one person who engages in constitutionally protected activity is compared
to the range of options generally available. See Kreimer, supra note 119, at 1359.
123. A number of cogent arguments can be advanced for applying the Sullivan and
Kreimer analysis to mandated segregation of tax-exempt and nonexempt activities. Applying
the same degree of scrutiny to the effects of mandated segregation as direct regulation would
provide continuity and predictability in an unsettled area of the law. As a simple matter of
logic, the government should not be permitted to deal organizations a "double whammy":
rights are burdened by the selective offer of benefits that penalize, but to avoid the penalty
effect, government mandates burdensome segregation with the same coercive effect.
124. Kreimer, supra note 119 at 1354. Kreimer characterizes the difference between an
offer and a threat in an original manner, "[i]f freedom is choice, a reduction of the range of
options associated with speech can be said to abridge freedom of speech in a way that an offer
to increasing the range of choices can not." Id.
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efit can determine whether a condition is coercive. 125 Some argue
that the standard of review which applies to direct regulation
should also apply to disparate tax treatment which implicates pro-
tected constitutional rights.
Richard Epstein gives a wide overview of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions,1 26 calling it a "second-best" alternative to an
imaginary free-market constitutional regime. 27 Epstein theorizes
that the government conditions should be subject to the same scru-
tiny as direct regulation: 121
If direct regulation proceeds largely without constitutional inter-
ference, then there is no reason to subject taxation to any higher
level of review. The situation is quite the opposite when speech is
affected. Here taxation and exemptions have the same effect as
they do in other contexts, and are subject to the same high levels
of scrutiny imposed on direct regulations generally.1 29
Therefore, the strength of the right which is threatened by a condi-
tion will ultimately determine whether a condition to a benefit is
unconstitutional.
Kathleen Sullivan denounces traditional analysis of the uncon-
stitutional conditions and introduces a "systemic approach" to un-
constitutional conditions which "recogniz[es] that constitutional
liberties regulate three relationships: the relationship between gov-
ernment and rightholders, horizontal relationships among
rightholders, and vertical relationships among rightholders ...
rights-pressuring conditions on government benefits potentially
skew all three."1 30
All three of these relationships can be affected by benefit alloca-
125. See, eg., Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1457. Sullivan writes that:
At first glance, "germaneness" in this context might seem to refer simply to the
standard means-ends rationality review characteristic of all claims of violation of a
constitutional right. But that is not the case; the two inquiries serve different func-
tions .... Unconstitutional conditions cases have used the germaneness inquiry to
resolve a different, prior question: does attachment of the condition to the benefit
burden a constitutional right?
Id
126. See Epstein, supra note 119.
127. See generally id. at 15-28.
128. Id. at 26-7. Epstein writes that "[i]f the direct use of government coercion is subject
to serious constitutional scrutiny, then the government bargains should be subject to a similar
level of scrutiny." Id at 26.
129. Id at 74-75.
130. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1491. Sullivan continues by distinguishing between "hori-
zontal" and "vertical" relations between rightholders. Whereas horizontal government even-
handedness examines the differences between those who accept conditional benefits and those
who do not, vertical government evenhandedness involves equality differences between mem-
bers of different classes. I1 at 1496-99.
486 [Vol. 3:459
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tion, so any alteration in the three relationships should trigger strict
scrutiny by the courts. Sullivan also suggests that the same degree
of scrutiny applies to direct regulation as conditions to benefit allo-
cation.131 "Government may not directly command or forbid ac-
tions protected by individual rights . . . because these decisions
belong in the realm of private ordering rather than government
control." 132
The Sullivan and Epstein standards for identifying unconstitu-
tional conditions would obviously be preferable to an organization
faced with a denial of tax-exempt status. These standards provide
greater protection to constitutional rights threatened by govern-
ment benefit allocation. Furthermore, the academic proposals pro-
vide tax-exempt organizations with a simpler and more predictable
constitutional standard.
The Court is not poised to adopt the more protective academic
standard to protect constitutional rights and invalidate funding de-
cisions that infringe on constitutional rights. The best interim solu-
tion is to amend the Internal Revenue Code to avoid
unconstitutional penalty effects resulting from a denial of tax-ex-
empt status to an entire organization that engages in a small pro-
portion of activity that the government refuses to fund. The
parameters of this type of amendment are discussed in the following
part.
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AMENDMENT
If an entire organization is denied tax-exempt status for engag-
ing in a proportion of abortion-related activity, legislation to deny
tax-exempt status could be seen as a penalty for engaging in consti-
tutionally protected rights. Requirements that government subsi-
dized projects be separated from unsubsidized activities could also
be unconstitutionally burdensome. Because of the organizational
scope of tax exemption, a denial of tax-exempt status to abortion
providers may invoke different constitutional barriers than the re-
fusal to fund abortions and abortion-related speech encountered in
131. Sullivan writes that "[c]urrent law in this area undoubtedly would invalidate all
three provisions [the Rust regulations, see, supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text] under
the first amendment had they been imposed directly-the first two [see Regulations, supra
notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text] as impermissible viewpoint censorship the third [see
Regulation, supra note 39 and accompanying text] as an impermissible administrative burden
on speech." Id. at 1466 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 1492.
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Rust v. Sullivan 133 and previous abortion funding cases. 134
An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code could solve the
unconstitutional conditions issues arising from penalty effects of the
allocation of tax exemption. This amendment cannot clear the am-
biguities of unconstitutional conditions doctrine or remove the po-
tential for coercive government subsidy decisions. But, if Congress
is given unremitting wide latitude in distinguishing between organi-
zations that receive the benefits of tax exemption, the amendment
could prevent the most coercive and unconstitutional legislative
conditions. This amendment allows for segregation of organiza-
tional activities for tax purposes. Thus, organizations can maintain
organizational tax-exempt status and donor deductions while Con-
gress avoids subsidy of legislatively unpreferred activities, like abor-
tion. 135  The proposed changes can also provide greater
predictability to organizations which risk losing organizational tax-
exempt status for engaging in a small proportion of activity that the
government refuses to subsidize.
An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code could provide for
differing tax treatment of distinct organizational activities.' 36 Such
an amendment could begin by identifying general types of organiza-
tions by the ratio of activities not preferred by the legislature (and
not subject to tax exemption) to activities that would normally be
identified as charitable and tax-exempt. Organizations would be de-
133. 111 S.Ct. 1759 (1991).
134. See supra note 16.
135. This argument presupposes that Congress will continue to allow hospitals to enjoy
tax-exempt status under § 501(cX3). The tax-exempt status of hospitals has been the subject
of Congressional inquiry and debate. See Hospital Charity Care and Tax Exempt Status: Re-
storing the Commitment and Fairness: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) ("One option would be to reestablish the link between tax
exemption and the level of charity care provided by hospitals .... On the other hand, those
that do not provide a reasonable level of charity care or other services to the poor would have
it [tax exemption] withdrawn."); U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN; SELECT COMMITrEE ON AGING, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS: BETrER STANDARDs NEEDED FOR TAX EXEMPTION 5 (May 1990) ("If the
Congress wishes to encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide charity care to the poor and
uninsured and other community services, it should consider revising the criteria for tax ex-
emption."); H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt.l, at 43 (1969) ("Such obligations to
serve those who cannot pay are indefinite under existing law.") While none of these legisla-
tive proposals has been successful, and a Select Committee lacks the power to sponsor legisla-
tion, a full denial of hospital tax exempt status is not outside the realm of possibility. See
generally Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals:
Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WAsH. L. REv. 307 (1991).
136. See generally, Developments in the Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1581, Part IV, 1654-56 (1992) (suggesting modification of federal tax incentives to limit
contingent-fee fund raising).
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fined as engaging in 1) a less than substantial amount of charitable
activity, 2) an insubstantial amount of unpreferred activity, or 3) a
substantial amount of unpreferred activity. Tax-exempt status
would vary according to these categories.
Tax-exempt status may be constitutionally denied to an organi-
zation engaging in any less than a substantial amount of charitable
activity. Here, any penalty effect on tax-exempt activities would be
attenuated and constitutionally permissible.137
By contrast, any constitutionally permissible amendment must
allow full tax exemption for organizations that engage in an insub-
stantial amount of unpreferred activity. This standard is borrowed
from I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) itself which applies to "Corporations,
and any community chest, fund, or foundation.. .no substantialpart
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to, to influence legislation." 138 With proper enforce-
ment mechanisms, the substantiality standard can practically guar-
antee that the government will not subsidize any significant amount
of legislatively unpreferred activity. Most importantly, the substan-
tiality standard incorporates constitutional limitation to penalty ef-
fects that exceed the scope of government subsidy.1 39
The "substantial part test" has been criticized for ambiguous-
ness and difficulty of application" Yet, companion provisions al-
lowing specific statutory dollar limits on the organization's
expenditures on unpreferred activity could also be enacted. Pres-
ently, section 501(h) and section 4911 allow election of more spe-
137. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 397-400 (1950).
138. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (emphasis added). See also Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion, 461 U.S. 540, 543 (1983) (explaining that a 501(c)(3) organization is not permitted to
lobby substantially to further their exempt purposes). See generally Laura B. Chisholm, Ex-
empt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201 (1987).
139. See F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984). See also supra notes
54, 55, 59-63.
140. In 1987, the Subcommittee an Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and
means held hearings on the lobbying and political activities of tax-exempt organizations. A
Joint Committee Print discussed the ambiguity of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) which "does not explain
the meaning, in this context, of the term 'substantial.' There is no precise mechanical rule for
determining the substantiality of an organization's lobbying activities in relation to other
activities." STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST SESS., LOBBY-
ING AND POLITICAL AcTIvrrIEs OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3-4 (Joint Comm. Print,
March 11, 1987).
The courts have held that flat percentage determinations are not outcome-determinative.
See Seasongood v. Comm'r, 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955) (less than 5 percent of organiza-
tional activity was not considered substantial); Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct.
Cl. 1974) (where between 16.6 and 20.5 percent of expenditures were for political lobbying no
deduction allowed, but court nevertheless rejected percentage test as "not appropriate"), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
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cific definition of section 501(c)(3) disqualifying activity. 41 An
excise tax and revocation of tax-exempt status, similar to current
provisions in section 4912 could be imposed on organizations that
violate the substantiality standard.142
141. See I.R.C. § 501(h) (providing election for more precise arithmetical test of imper-
missible amount of lobbying under 501(cX3) rather than the more general "substantiality"
test); § 4911 (defining the amount of lobbying which an organization with 501(h) election can
engage without penalty). The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added sections 501(h) and 4911 to the
Internal revenue Code in order that organizations could replace the substantiality test with an
expenditure-based limitation. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGwT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LOBBYING AND POLITICAL ACTivITIES BY
TAX-EXEMPT ORGS., 100TH CONG., lsT SEss. 20 (Comm. Print 1987). The preamble of the
IRS regulation explained:
An organization will lose its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) if a sub-
stantial part of its activities is lobbying. This is known as the "substantial part
test." Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was uncertainty about what consti-
tuted a "substantial part" of an organization's activities. Congress was aware both
of the severity of loss of tax exemption as a sanction and of the belief that the vague
standards of the substantial part test tended to create uncertainty and allow subjec-
tive and selective enforcement....
Because of its concerns about the "substantial part test," Congress enacted, in
1976, an alternative to the substantial part test. Under sections 50 1(h) and 4911,
which were added by section 1307 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, certain publicly
supported section 501(cX3) organizations may elect to spend up to a certain (declin-
ing) percentage of their "exempt purpose expenditures" to influence legislation
without incurring tax or losing qualification for tax-exempt status. Thus, if an eligi-
ble organization elects the "expenditure test" of sections 50 1(h) and 4911, specific
statutory dollar limits on the organization's lobbying expenditures apply. Under
the expenditure test, there are limits both upon the amount of the organization's
grass roots lobbying expenditures and upon the total amount of the organization's
direct and grass roots lobbying expenditures. In contrast to the substantial part
test, the expenditure test imposes no limit on lobbying activities that do not require
expenditures, such as certain unreimbursed lobbying activities conducted by bona
fide volunteers.
55 Fed. Reg. 35,579 (1990). These concerns would be as applicable in the context of deter-
mining the level of unpreferred activity that an organization can engage in without loosing
tax-exempt status altogether. Companion provisions, allowing election of more specific
guidelines, improve the specificity and predictability of the substantiality standard.
142. An excise tax could be modeled after I.R.C. § 4912. Subsequent to the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Congress enacted § 4912 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.
That section imposes an excise tax on the lobbying expenditures of public charities, other
than churches and certain church affiliated organizations, whose tax exempt status is revoked
for violating the "substantial part test". Federal regulations determined that:
In general, if either or both of the expenditure test limits are exceeded, section
4911 imposes a 25 percent excise tax upon the greater of: (1) the amount by which
the organization's grass roots lobbying expenditures exceed its grass roots lobbying
limit, or (2) the amount by which an organization's total direct and grass roots
lobbying expenditures exceed its total lobbying limit. Additionally, if an organiza-
tion's grass roots expenditures or total lobbying expenditures normally exceed 150
percent of the applicable limitation on its lobbying expenditures, the organization
will cease to be described in section 501(c)(3), and, therefore, will no longer be
exempt from income tax or be eligible to receive tax deductible charitable
contributions.
55 Fed. Reg. 35579, 35579-80. These parameters could be applied to a tax scheme designed
to limit tax-exemption to preferred charitable activities.
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When an organization engages in a substantial amount of unpre-
ferred activity, the Internal Revenue Code should allow for segrega-
tion of legislatively preferred and unpreferred activities. The
Supreme Court has referred to this as "fragmentation" of taxable
and tax-exempt income in a different context. 143  This could be
achieved with a provision similar to unrelated business income tax
(UBIT). 1 For example, section 513(c) of the UBIT allows charita-
ble organizations to fragment payments received in connection with
the performance of services (such as advertising by a tax-exempt
organization) which may be subject to taxation. Payments unre-
lated to taxable services maintain their separate character and de-
ductibility.1 45  A provision similar to IRC § 513(c), designed to
permit fragmentation of an exempt organization's constituent parts
would provide for taxation of income (and donor contributions) de-
rived from unpreferred activities.
The ability to fragment income from legislatively preferred and
unpreferred activities avoids unconstitutional penalties in two ways.
First, by allowing fragmentation, a penalty effect on preferred chari-
table activities of organizations performing both preferred and un-
preferred activities, as in Planned Parenthood of C. & N. Ariz. v.
State 146 and F. C. C. v. League of Women Voters 147 is avoided. Re-
call that in Regan v. Taxation With Representation,141 the ability to
segregate government funded activities from non-funded activities
under sections 501(c)(3)-(4) was critical to the government's ability
to attach conditions to subsidy, while avoiding forbidden conditions
on private funds.149
Secondly, if the tax structure mandates the segregation of pre-
ferred and unpreferred activities, regulations and requirements
could be unconstitutionally burdensome. A scheme to fragment or-
143. The Supreme Court has discussed the process of "fragmentation" in the context of
unrelated business income tax ("UBIT"). See United States v. American Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. 105 (1986); United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986).
144. I.R.C. §§ 511-14 (Law Co-op 1993) (determining when income received by a section
501 organization will be taxable income from an unrelated trade or business).
145. BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 41.2 at 862 (6th
ed. 1992).
146. 718 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1983).
147. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
148. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
149. See Id. In Bob Jones UnL v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), racially discrimina-
tory admissions policies and school rules which forbade interracial marriage could not be
segregated from the tax-exempt activities of the University. While the Court did not consider
any argument that the IRS ruling comprised a penalty on otherwise eligible activities, the
decision may suggest that especially egregious violations of public policy may be subject to
larger penalty effects. See id.
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ganizational tax-exempt status could be drafted to avoid burden-
some activity segregation requirements. The likely standard for
acceptable segregation burdens lies somewhere between FE.C. v.
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc. (invalidating detailed record-
keeping and disclosure obligations, obligation to appoint a treasurer
and custodian of the records, and high administrative costs) 50 and
Regan (upholding a return to a dual corporate structure used in the
past).151 In either case, it is likely that the court would protect or-
ganizations from regulations unrelated to insuring that tax-deducti-
ble contributions are not used to further unpreferred activities.1 "2
The same severability of operations in a government funded project
that allows a government "funding" decision to escape constitu-
tional limitations under the First or Fifth Amendments can be
achieved through fragmentation of tax-exempt and unpreferred or-
ganizational activity.15
Unconstitutional conditions analysis might provide protection
against coercive government benefit allocation. Yet, the malleabil-
ity of unconstitutional conditions protection 54 extends beyond the
150. 479 U.S. 238, 254-55. (1986). See supra note 86.
151. In Regan, the Court mandated segregation of lobbying and non-lobbying activities
into separate organizations. 461 U.S. at 544 n.6, 551. This segregation was approved by the
Court because TWR was originally formed by fusing two separate organizations:
One, Taxation With Representation Fund, was organized to promote TWR's goals
by publishing a journal and engaging in litigation; it had tax-exempt status under§ 501(c)(3). The other, Taxation With Representation, attempted to promote the
same goals by influencing legislation; it had tax-exempt status under § 501(cX4).
Id. at 543.
152. In Regan, the court upheld segregation requirements that required organizational
division:
TWR and some amici are concerned that the IRS may impose stringent require-
ments that are unrelated to the congressional purpose of ensuring that no tax-de-
ductible contributions are used to pay for substantial lobbying .... [n]o such
requirement in the Code or regulations has been called to our attention, nor have we
been able to discover one. The IRS apparently requires only that the two groups be
separately incorporated and keep records adequate to show that tax deductible con-
tributions are not used to pay for lobbying. This is not unduly burdensome.
Ii at 543 n.6.
153. The Rust case presented a fertile opportunity for the court to address the degree of
burdensome segregation between subsidized and unsubsidized activities that can be imposed
within the boundaries of the constitution. Nonetheless, the Court neglected to address this
issue with any degree of specificity. The HHS regulations upheld in Rust stated that, "[a]
title X project must be organized so that it is physically and financially separate.., from
activities which are prohibited under... the Act... and regulations" and that physical and
financial separateness includes "objective integrity and independence from prohibited activi-
ties. Mere bookkeeping separation of title X funds from other monies is not sufficient." 42
C.F.R. § 59.9 (1988). The HHS regulations may require some greater degree of segregation
than mandated by the Court in Regan. But the Court approved these vague regulations
without looking more specifically as what "objective integrity" might require.
154. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Right Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitu-
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context of abortion subsidy to other areas of the law. In an era of
growing government entitlement, a lack of specific constitutional
guidelines to benefit allocation encourages an inconsistent, nearly
haphazard constitutional policy to develop and gain acceptance
through the courts.' The proposed amendment to the tax code
has the distinct advantage over unconstitutional conditions protec-
tions because it provides a clear, predictable, codified standard to
organizations that engage in a proportion of unpreferred activity of
all types.
The intricacies of subsidy choices and their effect on the rela-
tionship between the state and the citizenry have been oversimpli-
fied by the courts, the legislatures, and the populace so far. Because
rights-altering conditions to government benefits have potential for
sweeping effects on the conventional relationship between a govern-
ment and its citizens, there is no time like the present for reassess-
ment and clarification of the limitations to unconstitutional
conditions.
The courts are not poised to adopt a more protective stance to-
ward constitutional rights that are threatened by government sub-
sidy distinctions. In the context of organizations providing
preferred charitable services as well as unpreferred activity, tax
code amendment could prevent the most coercive, unconstitutional
penalty effects of burdensome segregation of activities. If Congres-
sional interference is unavoidable, it had better not impose unconti-
tutional burdens on tax-exempt organizations.
In the broader sense, Congressional micromanagement of spe-
cific activities that receive tax exemption thwarts the critical policy
rationale of tax exemption. Tax exemption of charitable organiza-
tions is often justified by a public policy favoring pluralism:
Charitable organizations are regarded as fostering.. .pluralism
in the American social order. That is, society is regarded as ben-
efitting not only from the application of private wealth to specific
purposes in the public interest but also from the variety of
choices made by individual philanthropists as to which activities
to further. This decentralized choice making is arguably more
efficient and responsive to public needs than the... less flexible
tional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1987 (1990) ("The Court has provided no
coherent explication of when and how it will apply the doctrine in this area, and commenta-
tors' attempts to make sense of these cases have produced only expressions of despair .... ").
See generally, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (1991) (upholding state tax provisions
that exempted newspapers and magazines, but not cable television, from sales tax).
155. Note that equal protection arguments relating to disparate tax treatment are gener-
ally insufficient to invalidate legislation. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461
U.S. 540, 547-49 (1983). See also supra notes 37 and 39.
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allocation process of government administration.156
When Congress decides which preferred activities receive tax ex-
emption, pluralism is defeated rather than encouraged. As John
Stuart Mill wrote, "Government operations tend to be every where
alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary,
there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experi-
ence." 1 57 As government conditions on subsidy increase, a brave
new world may bring an end to diversity. In the mean time, a revi-
sion of the tax code provides the best interim solution to protect
tax-exempt organizations from burdensome and discriminatory tax
treatment.
CONCLUSION
This paper discusses constitutional limitations to legislation lim-
iting the tax-exempt status of abortion providers. If an entire or-
ganization is denied tax-exempt status for engaging in a proportion
of abortion-related activity, legislation could be seen as an unconsti-
tutional condition or penalty on constitutionally protected rights.
Requirements that government subsidized projects be separated
from unsubsidized activities could also be unconstitutionally bur-
densome. An amendment to the Internal Revenue Code could
solve the limited unconstitutional conditions issues arising from
penalty effects in the allocation of tax exemption. This amendment
would not solve ambiguities of unconstitutional conditions doctrine
or remove the potential for coercive government subsidy decisions
in hundreds of other contexts. Nonetheless, the proposed changes
avoid the most burdensome penalty effects of legislation and pro-
vide predictability to organizations at risk of losing organizational
tax-exempt status for engaging in a proportion of unpreferred
activity.
156. HOPKINS, supra note 145, § 1.3 at 10 (citations omitted).
157. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 213 (2d ed. 1863).
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